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000155_news@columbia.edu _Tue Oct 5 20:24:17 1999.msg
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From: adam@symcom.math.uiuc.edu (Adam H. Lewenberg)
Subject: Re: Kermit 95 as an ssh client?
Date: 6 Oct 1999 00:11:37 GMT
Organization: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Message-ID: <7te43p$fqk$1@vixen.cso.uiuc.edu>
To: kermit.misc@columbia.edu
Thank you for your thoughtful reply (again). I did learn something
new, namely the security limitations of ssh. I will look into this
more carefully.
The advantage of ssh is that all of the machines I connect to have it,
while none of them have srp. As for kerberos, I have not been able to
figure out how to install it on my home machine.
jaltman@watsun.cc.columbia.edu (Jeffrey Altman) writes:
>In article <7tdqq7$6se$1@vixen.cso.uiuc.edu>,
>Adam H. Lewenberg <adam@symcom.math.uiuc.edu> wrote:
>: Kermit 95 is _almost_ perfect. The last feature I would really like is
>: for kermit to act as an ssh client.
>:
>: Any chances of this happening in the near future?
>Adam:
>Its interesting that you are asking this question (again).
>I replied to you on 1 October 1998 in detail as to why the Kermit
>Project could not support SSH. In the last year absolutely nothing
>has changed. The RSA patent is still valid and SSHv2 has still
>not been approved by the IETF.
>In addition, it has become clear that SSH, when used with
>Public Key authentication, is a security nightmare when it is used
>and the client machine becomes compromised. While it may be an
>acceptable risk for individual users, it is not an acceptable risk
>for a system that supports thousands of users. When a host becomes
>root compromised all of the public key files that are found in the
>home directories of users may be accessed and used to break into
>additional machines. Unlike every other authentication mechanism
>the SSH public keys cannot be revoked and their reuse cannot be
>prevented.
>As for using SSH to simply prevent the transmission of plain text
>passwords, this only prevents a passive sniffer attack. It does not
>prevent an active man in the middle attack, nor does it protect against
>a root compromised host stealing passwords when a compromised login
>program is installed. Passwords should never be sent across the network.
>Not when truly secure systems are so easily accessible:
>. Secure Remote Password and other Zero Knowledge based systems
>. Kerberos varients
>. One Time Pads.
>While we may very well implement SSHv2 when it is finished, it will
>be only with very strong warnings against its use.
> Jeffrey Altman * Sr.Software Designer * Kermit-95 for Win32 and OS/2
> The Kermit Project * Columbia University
> 612 West 115th St #716 * New York, NY * 10025
> http://www.kermit-project.org/k95.html * kermit-support@kermit-project.org
--
University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, Dept. Of Mathematics
INTERNET: adam@math.uiuc.edu or lewenber@uiuc.edu